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Although cigarette manufacturers were aware of the addictive properties of nicotine as early as
1962, the information did not become available to the U.S. public until 1979 when it was
disclosed by the Surgeon General.  This study examines the impact that this information had on
the demand for cigarettes.  It is posited that the release of addiction information served to make
consumers aware of the implications of current consumption levels for future choices.  In the
absence of this information, consumers had to rely on their past consumption experience of the
addictive good.  That is, we posit that consumer demand was myopic before the release of
information in 1979 and switched to a rational form after the dissemination of addiction
information.  The theoretical model also generalizes the rational addiction model to include non-
addictive goods.  In addition, the model constructed in this paper empirically modifies the
rational addiction model to allow for the possibility of structural changes in the demand function
which may have occurred beginning in 1979.  A number of empirically testable restrictions on
the signs and relative magnitudes of the coefficients of the corresponding demand functions are
derived from the theoretical model.  A state disaggregated annual time series for the U.S.
comprised of consumption, price, and income data along with three smuggling indices was used
to empirically test our hypotheses.  The data fit the hypothesized model remarkably well, and a
switch from myopic to rational demand in 1979 was observed.  Signs and relative magnitudes of
all coefficients were significant and consistent with the theory.  We find that the impacts of past
consumption and price on current consumption decline after the release of addiction information,
while future consumption becomes a significant factor only after the release of addiction
information.THE IMPACT OF ADDICTION INFORMATION ON CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION
Although per capita cigarette consumption in the U.S. increased rapidly until about 1960,
the last four decades have experienced a steady decline in smoking.  Part of this decline has been
attributed to the increasing evidence of health hazards associated with smoking.  As early as
1953, the American Cancer Society and the British Medical Research Council reported that
smoking caused increased mortality rates.  By 1964, the Surgeon General had linked smoking to
cancer.  In the ensuing 15 years, health warnings were required to be printed on cigarette packs
and tobacco advertising was limited and eventually banned from broadcast media.  In 1979, the
Surgeon General conclusively stated that cigarettes were addictive and by 1986 reported that
cigarette smoking was the leading preventable cause of premature death and disability in the U.S.
During this same time frame, increasing excise taxes were working in combination with the
health warnings to diminish aggregate smoking levels.
Econometric studies of the demand for cigarettes have been numerous in the literature.  In
the earliest studies, cigarettes were modeled as a non-addictive good with demand primarily
dependent upon income and own price (Hamilton, 1972).  Later, the addictive nature of cigarettes
was accounted for in so-called “myopic” models by including past cigarette consumption as an
additional independent variable in the demand equation (Winston, 1980).  Most recently, Becker
and Murphy (1988) suggested that agents were “rational” (i.e., considered the future
consequences of their actions).  Becker and Murphy explicitly accounted for the addictive effects
of nicotine by incorporating an addictive stock into the utility function and by using an optimal
control approach to derive time consistent dynamic demand functions.  This approach yielded
demand functions in which current consumption depended on both past and future consumption.
Work by Chaloupka (1991) and by Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (BMG) (1994) gave2
empirical evidence to suggest that the rational model is more consistent with consumer behavior
than the myopic model.
The specific focus of this study will be the impact of addiction information on the
demand for cigarettes.  The Surgeon General did not inform the public about the addictive nature
of nicotine until 1979 although by the early 1960s major tobacco firms already knew that
cigarettes were addictive (Glantz, et al., 1995).  The theory of rational addiction will be used but
modified both theoretically and empirically to account for the release of addiction information in
1979.  Our theory will be empirically tested on annual U.S. per capita state-level data from 1955
to 1994.
THEORETICAL MODEL
In keeping with BGM who specify the optimization process in terms of discrete
functions, the agent’s utility function at any point in time is represented by
Ut = U(Yt,Ct,At,et)( 1 )
where Ct is the addictive good (cigarettes); Yt is the composite good; At is the stock of the
addictive good; and et represents other unobservable period t events that impact utility.  By
assumption, UCt > 0 (withdrawal), UAt < 0 (tolerance), and UYt > 0.  U(·) is assumed to be
strictly concave in all of its arguments.  (See Becker and Murphy for details.)
As in other models of rational addiction, a stock constraint must be specified.  Our simple
constraint
At = (1 - d )Ct-1 (2)
allows a non-addictive good to be nested within the rational model.  d is the depreciation rate of
the addictive stock.  Note that if the depreciation effects of the good are complete and
instantaneous (i.e., d=1), the addictive stock would be zero and the good is non-addictive.3
Assuming the agent lives for T years and discounts future utility at r, the rate of market
interest, and substituting equation (2) into (1), the agent’s lifetime utility function can be written 
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where b º 1/(1+r) is the agent’s discount factor.  When perfect capital markets are assumed to











where W0 is the present value of lifetime wealth; the price of Yt is one since Yt is the numeraire;
and Pt is the relative price of the addictive good in period t.  The consumer is assumed to
maximize lifetime utility given by equation (3) subject to an initial value of consumption, C
0, and
the lifetime budget constraint, equation (4).  If it is further assumed that the utility function is
quadratic in all its arguments, the following rational demand for cigarettes can be derived:
Ct = a0 + a1Ct-1 + a2Ct+1 + a3Pt + a4 et + a5et+1 (5)
where a1=ba2 and the a’s are non-linear functions of the parameters of the quadratic utility
function, b, d, and the Lagrange multiplier (which is fixed due to the assumption that the
marginal utility of wealth is constant).  (See Fenn and Antonovitz (1998) for details.)
The preceding derivation of a demand function for a rational addict is based on the
assumption that the consumer knows that the good is addictive and acts in a forward looking or
rational manner.  However, for the case of cigarettes, the Surgeon General did not specifically
inform the public that cigarettes were addictive until 1979.  In this paper, we posit that without
this addiction information, consumers act in a myopic manner.  Although cigarettes are indeed
addictive and consumption levels must compensate for the effects of tolerance, reinforcement4
and withdrawal due to past consumption, consumers do not explicitly account for the effect of
present consumption on future utility before 1979.  In other words, a one-period utility
maximization process is undertaken subject to an addictive stock constraint and a one-period
budget constraint.  Again assuming a quadratic form of the utility function, the following myopic
demand function can be derived:
Ct = q0 + q1Ct-1 + q2Pt + q3et (6)
where the q’s are non-linear functions of the parameters of the utility function, d, and the
Lagrange multiplier. (See Fenn and Antonovitz for details.)
In this study we posit that before 1979 demand was myopic and took the form of equation
(6); while after the release of the Surgeon General’s Report in 1979, demand became rational as
represented by equation (5).  It is also critical to note that the a’s in the rational demand equation
are not necessarily equal to the q’s in the myopic demand equation.  Hence, unlike previous
studies which simply include intercept shifters to capture changes in information sets, for the
case of an addictive good, this model allows for the possibility of a change in both the intercept
and the slope coefficients after the release of addiction information.  Furthermore, in keeping
with Chaloupka, if it is also assumed that Ct and At do not effect the marginal utility of Yt, the
following testable implications of our hypothesis can be easily derived: q1>a1>0, a2>0, q2<0,
a3<0, and ½q2½>½a3½.  In other words, past consumption will have a positive impact, and price a
negative impact, on current consumption in both the pre-information and post-information time
periods.  Future consumption is predicted to have a positive impact on current consumption only
after 1979.  In addition, after the release of addiction information, the ability of a unit of last
period’s consumption to increase this period’s consumption declines, and the effect of current
price on current quantity demanded is dampened.  (See Fenn and Antonovitz for details.)5
METHODOLOGY
The data set used in this work is comprised of state disaggregated annual time-series for
the fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia from 1955-1994.  It is essentially the same as
that used by BGM but extended by nine years.  Hence, additional details on the sources and
construction of the variables can be found in their paper.  Consumption, Ct, is measured by per
capita tax-paid cigarette sales in packs.  Price, Pt, is the average real retail price per pack
including state and federal excise taxes in 1982-84 dollars.  Because of significant differences in
state excise taxes, it is important to account for the impact of interstate smuggling on per capita
cigarette sales.  BGM as well as other authors account for two types of smuggling:  short-distance
or casual smuggling and long-distance or commercial smuggling.  Casual smuggling refers to the
actions of consumers who live in high-tax states but purchase cigarettes in neighboring low-tax
states for consumption at home.  Commercial smuggling refers to the organized attempts by
distributors to purchase cigarettes in the low-tax states of Virginia, North Carolina, and Kentucky
without the local tax indicia being attached.  They then ship them to other states where
counterfeit local indicia are attached.  These cigarettes are sold at (higher) existing retail prices.
We use the same indices as BGM to account for casual import smuggling, SDTIMPt; casual
export smuggling, SDTEXPt; and commercial smuggling, LDTAXt.  Each of these tax indices is
predicted to have a negative impact on cigarette consumption.  (See Fenn and Antonovitz for
details.)  Finally, in keeping with BGM, annual state specific real per capita disposable income,
INCt, is also included in the analysis.
Because myopic demand is a sub case of the rational addiction demand function, one can
operationalize the hypothesized structural changes in the demand function by specifying a
regression equation which allows one to model the changes in the magnitudes of the coefficients6
for the rational addiction demand function.  This is done by including a dummy variable, INFO,
which, if significant, will alter the magnitudes of the post-1979 coefficients.  INFO takes on a
value of zero for any year prior to 1979 and a value of one for the years 1979 and beyond.  The
complete regression equation is given by
C C INFO C C INFO C tt t t t =+ + + + -- ++ hh g h g 01 11 1 2 12 1 (* ) (* )
++ + + + hg h g h 33 4 4 5 P INFO P INC INFO INC SDTIMP tt t tt (* ) (* )
++ + gh g 56 6 (* ) (* ) INFO SDTIMP SDTEXP INFO SDTEXP tt t
++ + hg e 77 LDTAX INFO LDTAX tt t (* ) (7)
Note that the theory only predicts structural breaks in the coefficients on Ct-1, Ct+1, and Pt.
However, structural breaks in the remaining coefficients are also considered for completeness.
Predicted signs for all of the regression coefficients are summarized in Table 1.
EMPIRICAL PROCEDURES AND RESULTS
Because the data set is a state-specific time-series, a fixed effects model that employs
state-specific and annual dummies is used.  The annual dummies pick up the yearly effects of
health information and the recent media coverage of the tobacco industry, while the state
dummies compensate for the diversity in demographic composition, income and other state
specific variables that may be correlated with cigarette consumption.
Since the theoretical model is based on an intertemporal dynamic optimization, Ct-1 and
Ct+1 are endogenous in equation (7).  Faced with same problem but with a somewhat shorter data
series, BGM reject the null hypothesis of consistent OLS estimates at the one percent level using
a De-Min Wu F-test.  They devise several different sets of instrumental variables to account for
the endogeneity of past and future consumption.  Similarly, we use different combinations of lags
and leads of cigarette prices and excise taxes along with the other truly exogeneous variables in7
the model as instruments.  These sets of instruments are summarized in Table 2.  A two-stage
least squares estimation (2SLS) procedure is performed using each of four models listed in this
table.  As a comparison, an OLS estimate is also obtained and is referred to as model (v).
Finally, BGM address the concern about the presence of serial correlation and
heteroscedasticity by computing a variance-covariance matrix that was adjusted for the effects of
serial correlation and found that the corrected standard errors were not very different from the
uncorrected ones.  They also used weighted least squares to correct for possible
heteroscedasticity and found that their results did not change significantly.  Hence, we felt that
these concerns had already been adequately addressed for the purposes of our study.
The empirical results from each of the five models are reported in Table 3.  The left half
of the table gives the estimates of the demand equation parameters in the pre-information years
(pre-1979), and the right half gives the post-information coefficients.  The coefficients in any
particular column correspond to the estimates obtained by using the set of instruments indicated
by the column number described in Table 2.  The estimates for the various sets of instruments are
in general agreement in sign and magnitude and, hence, are used in the discussion of the
empirical results that follows.  OLS estimates (model v) are simply given for the purpose of
comparison but are likely to be inconsistent.
First, note that both the pre and post-information coefficients on Ct-1 are positive and
significant giving empirical evidence that cigarettes are, indeed, an addictive good.  Also, as
predicted by theory, the coefficient on Ct-1 becomes significantly smaller (or past consumption
has a smaller influence on current consumption) after 1979.
The coefficient on Ct+1 is not significantly different from zero in the pre-1979 years.
However, in the post information period, estimates are positive and significant which is in8
keeping with the prediction that a higher level of past consumption will spur an increase in
current consumption for a known addictive good.  Hence, these results suggest that the demand
for cigarettes was myopic prior to 1979 but switched to a rational demand function after the
release of addiction information.
The pre-1979 coefficient of INCt suggests that cigarettes were a normal good before
information was released; while afterwards, this coefficient became negative but lost
significance.  The theory gives no prediction of the sign of this coefficient before or after the
release of information.  In addition, it is interesting to note that a decline in the price of cigarettes
appears to lose its sales generating potential in the post-1979 time period as predicted by the
theory.
The coefficients of all three smuggling variables are negative and significant both before
and after 1979 which is consistent with predictions from the theory.  Although there are no
theoretical predictions for structural breaks on these coefficients, only SDTEXPt exhibits one.
The empirical results support the theory quite strongly.  The 2SLS estimates are not
sensitive to the choice of instruments.  The hypothesized shift from myopic to rational demand is
observed.  All coefficients have signs and relative magnitudes that are in accordance with their
theoretical counterparts.  These were summarized earlier in Table 1.
Recall that in the derivation of the rational addiction demand, equation (5), a1=ba2.  This
suggests that estimates of the discount factor, b, and the corresponding interest rate, r, can be
easily obtained by h1/h2 before 1979 and by (h1+g1)/(h2+g2) after 1979.  These estimates are
given at the bottom of Table 3.  Prior to 1979, the estimates of r are implausibly large; while after
1979, they are negative.  Since these estimates of the interest rates may cast suspicion on the9
robustness of our model, we re-estimate model (iv) using values of b fixed at more plausible
values.  The results from these restricted regressions are reported in Table 4.
The basic findings that were reported in Table 3 remain unaltered by the imposition of
different values of b ranging from 0.75 to 0.95.  These values of b correspond to interest rates of
0.33 to 0.05, respectively.  As Table 4 indicates, there is still a shift from a myopic to a rational
pattern of consumption after the release of addiction information.  The influence of past
consumption on current consumption gets weaker after the release of addiction information.  The
influence of price on current consumption declines in the post-1979 period compared to its
influence prior to 1979.  The smuggling indices retain their negative signs as predicted by the
theory.  In essence, the imposition of reasonable discount factors does little to undermine the
empirical support the for rational addiction model with structural breaks.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In 1979 the Surgeon General informed the American public that cigarette smoking was
addictive.  This study examines the impact that this information had on the demand for
cigarettes.  We posit that consumer demand was myopic before the release of this information in
1979 but switched to a rational form after the dissemination of addiction information.  Given
these hypotheses, a number of empirically testable restrictions on the coefficients of the
corresponding demand functions were derived.  A state disaggregated annual time series for the
U.S. comprised of consumption, price, and income data along with three smuggling indices was
used to empirically test our hypotheses.  The data fit the hypothesized model remarkably well,
and a switch from myopic to rational demand in 1979 was observed.  Signs and relative
magnitudes of all coefficients were significant and consistent with the theory.10
This work provides a starting point for many interesting research questions.  Perhaps an
estimate of how the demand for cigarettes might have changed if the addiction information had
been released in the early 1960s could be examined along with the value of this information.11


















        Table 2.  Sets of Lag and Lead Instruments for Ct-1 and Ct+1
Model Instruments Used
(i) Pt-1 and Pt+1
(ii) Pt-1, Pt+1 Tt and Tt-1
(iii) Pt-1, Pt+1 Tt, Tt-1  and T t+1
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